행복한사회한국은 지옥이다. 출산엄금~~~~^^
●한국 정치민주주의 제도
한국선거제도는
우매힌 다수의 국민들이 정치인의 거짖말에 속아
사기꾼 정치인을 투표로 뽑는 제도이다.
선거때만 민주주이지
정권을 일단 잡으면 막강한 권한부여로
집권 동안 독제를 한다.
5년씩 돌아가며 한땅씩 해먹는 제도이다.
정권의 성공은 행정력과 언론과 방송등을 통해
국민들을 얼마나 잘 속이느냐에 달려 있다.
민주, 자유, 인권, 국민, 서민, 청년, 약자, 정의,
공정, 평화, 종교팔이 등으로
립서비스하며 국민들을 기만하고 속인다.
이런 국민감정을 이용한 심리전은
문제인, 노무현, 김대중 가장 많이 이용했다.
정치 현실은 정반대로 행동 한다.
득표를 위해 세금을 마구 뿌리고 선심성공약으로
물가폭등 주택폭등을 야기하여
유산자와 무산자간의
빈부격차와 앙극회을 계속 확대 시켜
서민과 청년, 사회적 약자들에게 고통을 안겨준다.
민주주의선거는 투표권이 있는 다수결의 원칙으로
투표권이 없거나 행사못하는 어린이, 노인, 장애인,
질병자등 약자들은 희생양이 된다.
이들은 보육시설, 요양원, 복지시설등에서
집단사육 당하고 있다.
시설내 폭행 차별 따돌림 고문 정말 지옥이다.
인권위원회는 범죄자인권보다
사회적약자와 범죄피해자인권을 먼저 챙겨야 한다.
인권을 정치적으로 이용하면 위험하다.
한국은 민주주의 선거하다 망할 것이다.
진정한 민주주의는
정치민주주의가 아니라
경제민주주의를 실시해야 한다.
●한국 경제독제 제도
한국경제는
지본주의 유산세습, 불로소등이 주도하는 경제독제다.
자유시장경제라 미사구어로 좋게 말하지만
양육강식의 경제독제다.
지본주의에서 노동자는 착취와 노예의 대상일 뿐이다.
한국은 유산세습, 투기꾼, 사기꾼, 집권자가
한탕씩 해먹고 부자되고 잘 사는 나라이다.
한국 부자유형을 보면
유산세습자와
토지 형질변경, 용도변경, 개발지역만 되면
수십배이상 폭등, 임대소득 토지와 주택등
부동산폭등으로 부자와 기득권자들은
돈벌기가 누워서 침뱃는 것 보다 더 쉽다.
재산없는 근로지들은 노동으로 돈벌기가 너무 힘들고
어렵게 번 소득도 대분분 세금과 공과금, 금융대출,
전월세임대료 고가의료 고가교육 종교갈취등으르
착취당하고 물가폭등으로 잠식되어 사라진다
후진국 외국인 근로자를 마구 들여와
내국인근로자들을 경쟁시키며
저임금으로 괴롭히고 고통을 안겨 주었다.
서민과 청년들이 노예자식을 출산 안하니까
외국에서 노예를 수입 하는 것이다.
미국도 이런식으로 근로자를 수급하였다.
이민자를 많이 받아들이는 것은
내국인 서민과 근로자들이 살기 힘들어
출산을 않하자 외국인을 빋아들이는 것이다.
노동자들은 아무리 죽어라 일하고 노력해도
근로소득 만으로는 생필품 의식주 주택하나
살수없는 가난한 착쥐의 나라다.
자본주의 독제경제는 근로자들의 고혈을
착취하여 발전하는 나라다.
서민과 청년, 근로자들는
저임금과 물가폭등으로 실질소득인 구매력을
떨어뜨려 끝 없이 착쥐 당하고
주거착취, 노동착취, 성착취, 세금착취, 금융착취,
종교착취, 의료착취, 교육착취, 사기등범죄착취
당하고 노예, 거지, 빚쟁이 된다.
당연히 출산은 줄어들고 자살은 늘어난다.
정부는 국민들을 속이기 위해 아동수당, 출산수당,
육아수당등 푼돈을 집어주며 서민들을
속이고 있다.
더 이싱 정부에 속을 어리석은 국민들은 거의 없다.
그래서
외국인 근로자들을 마구 받아들이는 것이다.
외국인근로자들은 한국에서 돈만 벌고 다시 자국으로
귀국하여 환률격차로 부자되고 잘사니까 상관없다.
내국인근로자들은 화려한 경제속에 금융대출착취
전,월세착취 세금과 공과금착취,
주탠폭등, 물가폭등 착취당하며
가난하게 살게 된다.
한국의 민주주의와 경제발전 겉만보고 탈북자나 외국인들은 한국 오면 안된다.
한국은 인간시장 거대한 카지도 도박장 같은
잔인한 나라다.
서민과 청년, 약자들은 북한보다 더 살기 힘든 나라다.
한국은 지옥이다.
●한국 정치민주주의 제도
한국선거제도는
우매힌 다수의 국민들이 정치인의 거짖말에 속아
사기꾼 정치인을 투표로 뽑는 제도이다.
선거때만 민주주이지
정권을 일단 잡으면 막강한 권한부여로
집권 동안 독제를 한다.
5년씩 돌아가며 한땅씩 해먹는 제도이다.
정권의 성공은 행정력과 언론과 방송등을 통해
국민들을 얼마나 잘 속이느냐에 달려 있다.
민주, 자유, 인권, 국민, 서민, 청년, 약자, 정의,
공정, 평화, 종교팔이 등으로
립서비스하며 국민들을 기만하고 속인다.
이런 국민감정을 이용한 심리전은
문제인, 노무현, 김대중 가장 많이 이용했다.
정치 현실은 정반대로 행동 한다.
득표를 위해 세금을 마구 뿌리고 선심성공약으로
물가폭등 주택폭등을 야기하여
유산자와 무산자간의
빈부격차와 앙극회을 계속 확대 시켜
서민과 청년, 사회적 약자들에게 고통을 안겨준다.
민주주의선거는 투표권이 있는 다수결의 원칙으로
투표권이 없거나 행사못하는 어린이, 노인, 장애인,
질병자등 약자들은 희생양이 된다.
이들은 보육시설, 요양원, 복지시설등에서
집단사육 당하고 있다.
시설내 폭행 차별 따돌림 고문 정말 지옥이다.
인권위원회는 범죄자인권보다
사회적약자와 범죄피해자인권을 먼저 챙겨야 한다.
인권을 정치적으로 이용하면 위험하다.
한국은 민주주의 선거하다 망할 것이다.
진정한 민주주의는
정치민주주의가 아니라
경제민주주의를 실시해야 한다.
●한국 경제독제 제도
한국경제는
지본주의 유산세습, 불로소등이 주도하는 경제독제다.
자유시장경제라 미사구어로 좋게 말하지만
양육강식의 경제독제다.
지본주의에서 노동자는 착취와 노예의 대상일 뿐이다.
한국은 유산세습, 투기꾼, 사기꾼, 집권자가
한탕씩 해먹고 부자되고 잘 사는 나라이다.
한국 부자유형을 보면
유산세습자와
토지 형질변경, 용도변경, 개발지역만 되면
수십배이상 폭등, 임대소득 토지와 주택등
부동산폭등으로 부자와 기득권자들은
돈벌기가 누워서 침뱃는 것 보다 더 쉽다.
재산없는 근로지들은 노동으로 돈벌기가 너무 힘들고
어렵게 번 소득도 대분분 세금과 공과금, 금융대출,
전월세임대료 고가의료 고가교육 종교갈취등으르
착취당하고 물가폭등으로 잠식되어 사라진다
후진국 외국인 근로자를 마구 들여와
내국인근로자들을 경쟁시키며
저임금으로 괴롭히고 고통을 안겨 주었다.
서민과 청년들이 노예자식을 출산 안하니까
외국에서 노예를 수입 하는 것이다.
미국도 이런식으로 근로자를 수급하였다.
이민자를 많이 받아들이는 것은
내국인 서민과 근로자들이 살기 힘들어
출산을 않하자 외국인을 빋아들이는 것이다.
노동자들은 아무리 죽어라 일하고 노력해도
근로소득 만으로는 생필품 의식주 주택하나
살수없는 가난한 착쥐의 나라다.
자본주의 독제경제는 근로자들의 고혈을
착취하여 발전하는 나라다.
서민과 청년, 근로자들는
저임금과 물가폭등으로 실질소득인 구매력을
떨어뜨려 끝 없이 착쥐 당하고
주거착취, 노동착취, 성착취, 세금착취, 금융착취,
종교착취, 의료착취, 교육착취, 사기등범죄착취
당하고 노예, 거지, 빚쟁이 된다.
당연히 출산은 줄어들고 자살은 늘어난다.
정부는 국민들을 속이기 위해 아동수당, 출산수당,
육아수당등 푼돈을 집어주며 서민들을
속이고 있다.
더 이싱 정부에 속을 어리석은 국민들은 거의 없다.
그래서
외국인 근로자들을 마구 받아들이는 것이다.
외국인근로자들은 한국에서 돈만 벌고 다시 자국으로
귀국하여 환률격차로 부자되고 잘사니까 상관없다.
내국인근로자들은 화려한 경제속에 금융대출착취
전,월세착취 세금과 공과금착취,
주탠폭등, 물가폭등 착취당하며
가난하게 살게 된다.
한국의 민주주의와 경제발전 겉만보고 탈북자나 외국인들은 한국 오면 안된다.
한국은 인간시장 거대한 카지도 도박장 같은
잔인한 나라다.
서민과 청년, 약자들은 북한보다 더 살기 힘든 나라다.
한국은 지옥이다.
최민규멋진걸로
홍어몰살∼◆홍어seki
에이즈나 걸렸길 바란다.
에이즈나 걸렸길 바란다.
최범석중국은 이제 문닫아야죠
욕지도https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/06/23/can-the-fed-pull-off-a-controlled-slowdown-of-the-housing-market
Can the Fed pull off a controlled slowdown of the housing market?
The events of the early 1980s might provide a guide
Estate agents are known for their sunny disposition. Lindsay Garcia, a realtor in Miami, is no exception. She talks about the city’s warm climate and low taxes, both of which have lured a wave of footloose outsiders. For much of the past two years agents enjoyed a bonanza. Buyers fought to outbid each other, waived property inspections and bought units sight unseen; many paid well over the asking price. Then mortgage rates began to climb this year, cooling the frenzy a little. Only houses that were newly renovated or ready to be moved into straight away received multiple offers, Ms Garcia says. Now a fresh spike in mortgage rates seems to have slammed the brakes on altogether.
On June 15th the Federal Reserve raised interest rates by 0.75 percentage points. Figures released a day later revealed that the benchmark 30-year fixed mortgage rate had hit 5.78%, an increase of more than half a percentage point over the week before. By June 17th, two of Ms Garcia’s colleagues had been rung up by buyers abruptly calling off deals because they could no longer afford them.
The plight of the would-be buyers illustrates just how swift and brutal the rise in interest rates has been, and how immediate its impact is on interest-sensitive sectors such as housing. In January mortgage rates were around 3%, only a little above their all-time low of 2.67%, reached during the pandemic. They have nearly doubled since (see chart); only in the 1980s was there a comparably rapid rise in interest rates. The increase has made houses even more unaffordable. In January a buyer with a deposit of $100,000 looking to spend $3,000 a month on housing could afford a home worth $815,000. Now they can afford one worth just $600,000.
The prospect of a turn in the property market’s fortunes naturally calls to mind America’s housing crisis of 2007-09. But there are important differences between the two situations. Rising interest rates in the late 2000s revealed just how imprudent mortgage lending had been. By contrast, the median fico score—a measure of creditworthiness—for mortgages today is about 48 points higher than the pre-financial-crisis level of around 700. Household balance-sheets are robust, bolstered by pandemic stimulus, and in aggregate there has been far less borrowing for house purchases than in the early 2000s. The total value of mortgage debt is around 65% of household income, compared with nearly 100% in 2007.
Though it is possible that pockets of dodgy debt lurk in the shadows today, it seems less probable that rising rates will uncover systemic weaknesses in lending standards that could set off a vicious cycle of falling prices and foreclosures. Instead the problem of 2022 is house-price growth itself. “The type of acceleration in house prices that we’ve seen over the past two years is unprecedented,” says Enrique Martínez-García of the Dallas Fed. By the first quarter of the year the increase in American house prices over the previous two years, at 37%, was the fastest on record.
That rapid growth is a problem for the Fed, argues Mr Martínez-García, because it feeds into rents, which in turn contribute to headline inflation. According to Redfin, a property platform, asking rents in May were 15% higher than in the same month last year. As new leases are signed, these will eventually add to consumer-price inflation. Indeed, rising housing costs already accounted for 40% of the monthly increase in the consumer-price index in May. “Cooling the housing market is almost a precondition to being able to tame inflation,” says Mr Martínez-García. A housing slowdown, then, will this time be engineered, rather than uncovered.
The best possible outcome is that the Fed manages to slow the property market by enough to bring inflation under control, without overdoing it. The events of the early 1980s, when interest rates last climbed so quickly, illustrate what such a controlled slowdown might look like. Inflation soared to well above 10%, Paul Volcker had just been appointed chairman of the Fed, and the federal funds rate was briefly raised to an all-time high of about 20%. Property prices did fall sharply—but only in real terms. From 1979 to 1982 real house prices fell by nearly a fifth, even as prices in nominal terms rose by a tenth. More notably, housing transactions fell off a cliff. Existing-home sales peaked at 4m in 1978; four years later, only 2m homes were sold.
Higher interest rates this time are indeed likely to hit transaction volumes first. That the initial consequence will be a fall in property sales, rather than a rise in financial distress among homeowners, can be partly explained by a quirk in the America’s mortgage market.
In most countries borrowers are offered fixed interest rates for only two to five years; when that period ends, the rate floats in line with the central bank’s policy rate. But the existence of America’s government-sponsored housing agencies, most notably Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were set up to incentivise home ownership, means that the vast majority of American mortgages are on a 30-year fixed rate. That makes would-be sellers increasingly reluctant to move and give up their cheap mortgages when rates go up. Buyers, meanwhile, can no longer afford the kind of house they want. Daryl Fairweather of Redfin therefore expects the market to go into a “cold period” of scant activity for the rest of the year.
Things could easily get more complicated than they did in the 1980s, though, if the Fed is unable to act with enough precision to stabilise the market without causing prices to crash. The fact that housing has been so frothy makes the task harder. What has been remarkable about the past couple of years of price growth is that it has been so difficult to square with any of the “usual explanations”, such as millennial household formation or supply constraints, says Mr Martínez-García. Once those explanations have been ruled out, all that is left is “expectations”, such as the fear of missing out on ever being able to buy a house. Cooling a hot property market by just enough to quell inflation is one thing. Deflating a bubble without popping it is another. ■
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Can the Fed pull off a controlled slowdown of the housing market?
The events of the early 1980s might provide a guide
Estate agents are known for their sunny disposition. Lindsay Garcia, a realtor in Miami, is no exception. She talks about the city’s warm climate and low taxes, both of which have lured a wave of footloose outsiders. For much of the past two years agents enjoyed a bonanza. Buyers fought to outbid each other, waived property inspections and bought units sight unseen; many paid well over the asking price. Then mortgage rates began to climb this year, cooling the frenzy a little. Only houses that were newly renovated or ready to be moved into straight away received multiple offers, Ms Garcia says. Now a fresh spike in mortgage rates seems to have slammed the brakes on altogether.
On June 15th the Federal Reserve raised interest rates by 0.75 percentage points. Figures released a day later revealed that the benchmark 30-year fixed mortgage rate had hit 5.78%, an increase of more than half a percentage point over the week before. By June 17th, two of Ms Garcia’s colleagues had been rung up by buyers abruptly calling off deals because they could no longer afford them.
The plight of the would-be buyers illustrates just how swift and brutal the rise in interest rates has been, and how immediate its impact is on interest-sensitive sectors such as housing. In January mortgage rates were around 3%, only a little above their all-time low of 2.67%, reached during the pandemic. They have nearly doubled since (see chart); only in the 1980s was there a comparably rapid rise in interest rates. The increase has made houses even more unaffordable. In January a buyer with a deposit of $100,000 looking to spend $3,000 a month on housing could afford a home worth $815,000. Now they can afford one worth just $600,000.
The prospect of a turn in the property market’s fortunes naturally calls to mind America’s housing crisis of 2007-09. But there are important differences between the two situations. Rising interest rates in the late 2000s revealed just how imprudent mortgage lending had been. By contrast, the median fico score—a measure of creditworthiness—for mortgages today is about 48 points higher than the pre-financial-crisis level of around 700. Household balance-sheets are robust, bolstered by pandemic stimulus, and in aggregate there has been far less borrowing for house purchases than in the early 2000s. The total value of mortgage debt is around 65% of household income, compared with nearly 100% in 2007.
Though it is possible that pockets of dodgy debt lurk in the shadows today, it seems less probable that rising rates will uncover systemic weaknesses in lending standards that could set off a vicious cycle of falling prices and foreclosures. Instead the problem of 2022 is house-price growth itself. “The type of acceleration in house prices that we’ve seen over the past two years is unprecedented,” says Enrique Martínez-García of the Dallas Fed. By the first quarter of the year the increase in American house prices over the previous two years, at 37%, was the fastest on record.
That rapid growth is a problem for the Fed, argues Mr Martínez-García, because it feeds into rents, which in turn contribute to headline inflation. According to Redfin, a property platform, asking rents in May were 15% higher than in the same month last year. As new leases are signed, these will eventually add to consumer-price inflation. Indeed, rising housing costs already accounted for 40% of the monthly increase in the consumer-price index in May. “Cooling the housing market is almost a precondition to being able to tame inflation,” says Mr Martínez-García. A housing slowdown, then, will this time be engineered, rather than uncovered.
The best possible outcome is that the Fed manages to slow the property market by enough to bring inflation under control, without overdoing it. The events of the early 1980s, when interest rates last climbed so quickly, illustrate what such a controlled slowdown might look like. Inflation soared to well above 10%, Paul Volcker had just been appointed chairman of the Fed, and the federal funds rate was briefly raised to an all-time high of about 20%. Property prices did fall sharply—but only in real terms. From 1979 to 1982 real house prices fell by nearly a fifth, even as prices in nominal terms rose by a tenth. More notably, housing transactions fell off a cliff. Existing-home sales peaked at 4m in 1978; four years later, only 2m homes were sold.
Higher interest rates this time are indeed likely to hit transaction volumes first. That the initial consequence will be a fall in property sales, rather than a rise in financial distress among homeowners, can be partly explained by a quirk in the America’s mortgage market.
In most countries borrowers are offered fixed interest rates for only two to five years; when that period ends, the rate floats in line with the central bank’s policy rate. But the existence of America’s government-sponsored housing agencies, most notably Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were set up to incentivise home ownership, means that the vast majority of American mortgages are on a 30-year fixed rate. That makes would-be sellers increasingly reluctant to move and give up their cheap mortgages when rates go up. Buyers, meanwhile, can no longer afford the kind of house they want. Daryl Fairweather of Redfin therefore expects the market to go into a “cold period” of scant activity for the rest of the year.
Things could easily get more complicated than they did in the 1980s, though, if the Fed is unable to act with enough precision to stabilise the market without causing prices to crash. The fact that housing has been so frothy makes the task harder. What has been remarkable about the past couple of years of price growth is that it has been so difficult to square with any of the “usual explanations”, such as millennial household formation or supply constraints, says Mr Martínez-García. Once those explanations have been ruled out, all that is left is “expectations”, such as the fear of missing out on ever being able to buy a house. Cooling a hot property market by just enough to quell inflation is one thing. Deflating a bubble without popping it is another. ■
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