욕지도https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20221025/116154323/1
[사설]위안화·홍콩증시 폭락, ‘시진핑 1인 지배 리스크’ 서막일 뿐
입력 2022-10-26 00:00업데이트 2022-10-26 00:00
시진핑 중국 국가주석이 권력 독점에 성공했지만 그가 이끌 중국 경제에 대한 시장의 평가는 냉정했다. 제20차 중국공산당 전국대표대회에서 시 주석 1인 독재 체제가 완성된 다음 날 위안화 가치는 글로벌 금융위기 이후 최저로 떨어졌고, 홍콩증시는 6% 넘게 폭락했다. 공동부유(共同富裕) 정책기조에 따라 민간기업에 대한 통제가 강화되면 더 이상 과거와 같은 중국의 고도성장은 어려울 것이라는 전망이 나온다.
홍콩에 상장된 중국 본토 기업들의 주가인 항셍중국기업지수는 어제 일부 반등했지만 전날 7% 넘게 하락해 1994년 이후 최저 수준을 보이고 있다. 위안화 가치는 연 이틀 2008년 이후 최저로 떨어졌다. 미국 뉴욕증시에 상장된 알리바바 등 5대 중국기업 주가는 일제히 폭락해 하루 만에 시가총액 75조 원이 증발했다. 경제 전반에 대한 공산당의 통제 강화, ‘제로 코로나’ 정책 지속에 대한 우려 때문이다.
3분기 중국 성장률은 3.9%로 시장 예상보다 높았지만 1∼9월 누적 성장률은 3%로 중국 정부의 연간 목표치 5.5%에 크게 못 미쳤다. 새로 구성된 공산당 중앙정치국 위원 24명 가운데 경제 전문가가 단 한 명뿐인 점 등 향후 중국 경제가 시장논리가 아닌 ‘시진핑 사상’에 좌우될 것이라는 우려를 키우고 있다.
문제는 중국 경제의 악화가 한국에 곧바로 영향을 미친다는 점이다. 최대 교역국인 중국의 성장률이 1%포인트 하락하면 한국 수출은 0.35%포인트, 소비는 0.14%포인트 줄어든다. 외국인 투자자가 이탈해 중국 위안화가 약세를 보이면 한국 원화 가치가 덩달아 하락하는 동조현상도 심해지고 있다.
중국발 정치 리스크가 커짐에 따라 우리 경제의 수출, 수입처 다변화는 더욱 시급해졌다. 중국에 있는 한국 기업의 생산시설은 여러 나라에 분산해 위험을 줄여야 한다. ‘차이나 엑소더스’에 나선 선진국 기업과 자본을 적극적으로 한국에 유치해 위기를 기회로 만드는 등 산업전략의 틀을 완전히 새롭게 짜야 할 때다.
[사설]위안화·홍콩증시 폭락, ‘시진핑 1인 지배 리스크’ 서막일 뿐
입력 2022-10-26 00:00업데이트 2022-10-26 00:00
시진핑 중국 국가주석이 권력 독점에 성공했지만 그가 이끌 중국 경제에 대한 시장의 평가는 냉정했다. 제20차 중국공산당 전국대표대회에서 시 주석 1인 독재 체제가 완성된 다음 날 위안화 가치는 글로벌 금융위기 이후 최저로 떨어졌고, 홍콩증시는 6% 넘게 폭락했다. 공동부유(共同富裕) 정책기조에 따라 민간기업에 대한 통제가 강화되면 더 이상 과거와 같은 중국의 고도성장은 어려울 것이라는 전망이 나온다.
홍콩에 상장된 중국 본토 기업들의 주가인 항셍중국기업지수는 어제 일부 반등했지만 전날 7% 넘게 하락해 1994년 이후 최저 수준을 보이고 있다. 위안화 가치는 연 이틀 2008년 이후 최저로 떨어졌다. 미국 뉴욕증시에 상장된 알리바바 등 5대 중국기업 주가는 일제히 폭락해 하루 만에 시가총액 75조 원이 증발했다. 경제 전반에 대한 공산당의 통제 강화, ‘제로 코로나’ 정책 지속에 대한 우려 때문이다.
3분기 중국 성장률은 3.9%로 시장 예상보다 높았지만 1∼9월 누적 성장률은 3%로 중국 정부의 연간 목표치 5.5%에 크게 못 미쳤다. 새로 구성된 공산당 중앙정치국 위원 24명 가운데 경제 전문가가 단 한 명뿐인 점 등 향후 중국 경제가 시장논리가 아닌 ‘시진핑 사상’에 좌우될 것이라는 우려를 키우고 있다.
문제는 중국 경제의 악화가 한국에 곧바로 영향을 미친다는 점이다. 최대 교역국인 중국의 성장률이 1%포인트 하락하면 한국 수출은 0.35%포인트, 소비는 0.14%포인트 줄어든다. 외국인 투자자가 이탈해 중국 위안화가 약세를 보이면 한국 원화 가치가 덩달아 하락하는 동조현상도 심해지고 있다.
중국발 정치 리스크가 커짐에 따라 우리 경제의 수출, 수입처 다변화는 더욱 시급해졌다. 중국에 있는 한국 기업의 생산시설은 여러 나라에 분산해 위험을 줄여야 한다. ‘차이나 엑소더스’에 나선 선진국 기업과 자본을 적극적으로 한국에 유치해 위기를 기회로 만드는 등 산업전략의 틀을 완전히 새롭게 짜야 할 때다.
욕지도https://youtu.be/2YsvbEVDjZ4
정예서.
욕지도https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/10/25/xi-jinping-provokes-a-spectacular-sell-off-in-chinas-markets
Xi Jinping provokes a spectacular sell-off in China’s markets
Investors must now choose between value and values
n october 23rd China’s ruler, Xi Jinping, asked the Central Committee of the Communist Party to endorse him and his team of loyalists to run the country for the next five years. He had no trouble securing their support. But the next day, he had a lot more difficulty with the highly decentralised committee that is the global financial market.
Foreign investors dumped China’s shares and its currency in spectacular fashion. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng stockmarket index, dominated by mainland firms, fell by over 6%. The sell-off was even worse in New York. The Golden Dragon index of Chinese companies listed on the tech-heavy Nasdaq, which includes giants like Alibaba and Baidu, fell at one point by 20%, reaching levels last seen before Mr Xi took power ten years ago. The offshore yuan, which fluctuates more freely than its onshore counterpart, weakened to its lowest value against the dollar since the market began in 2010 (see chart).
Mr Xi’s third term as leader was no surprise. But he disappointed investors with his picks for the party’s new Politburo and its powerful seven-member Standing Committee. Investors had hoped these bodies would include market-friendly officials, recognised for their ability not just their loyalty. When China’s financial markets plunged in March, investors were reassured by soothing words from Liu He, a Politburo member and a respected economic authority. No one of his stature could voice the same lines today. The upper echelons of China’s communist party lack people whose expertise and experience might provide a check on Mr Xi’s economic instincts.
These instincts have become clearer over time. The word “security”, for example, appeared 91 times in Mr Xi’s report to the party congress on October 16th. Mr Xi is determined to fortify China against America’s strategy of economic containment. He seems less interested in keeping foreign companies happy so that they will speak up against this strategy in their home countries. Faced with “external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China”, he said, “we have shown a fighting spirit and a firm determination to never yield to coercive power.”
Mr Xi’s calls for “common prosperity” also worry foreign investors. His goal of broadening wealth and narrowing inequality has some economic, as well as social, justification. Increasing the share of national income paid to workers could help rebalance China’s economy away from investment towards consumption. Indeed, increasing labour’s slice of the cake is one of the indicators tracked by the imf on its “rebalancing scorecard” for China. But investors fear new taxes on wealth or capital gains. And “common prosperity” has become associated with a clumsy crackdown on some of China’s most successful tech firms.
Mr Xi has shown little interest in reducing the role of state-owned enterprises to give private firms more room to prosper. Instead of urging the state to retreat, he wants the party to advance. “Party building will...be stepped up” in private firms, he said in his report to congress. Colin Hawes of the University of Technology Sydney has argued that private firms have, for the most part, successfully co-opted the party organisations within them. These organisations are often led by the firm’s boss. Their members know that it is the firm not the party that pays their salaries. There is, though, no guarantee this modus vivendi will last, especially in some of the bigger companies favoured by foreign investors.
China’s faltering markets have become “disconnected” from improving fundamentals, according to investment strategists at JPMorgan Chase. Economic data released on October 24th showed that China’s gdp grew by 3.9% in the third quarter, compared with a year earlier. The figure, which appeared later than scheduled, was also faster than expected. Like all Chinese data, it was met with scepticism. But it was not obviously out of line with several lower-profile indicators, like electricity production, which grew by more than 6% over the same period.
The reshuffle of China’s leadership may be provoking a reshuffle of China’s investor base. Given Mr Xi’s growing power and declining pragmatism, investors must ask themselves whether or not they can stomach his philosophy. For investors who can’t, getting out is the only course of action. For those who can, Chinese companies now look cheap relative to their earnings prospects. The future of China’s markets will thus be determined by the tug of war between value and values.
Xi Jinping provokes a spectacular sell-off in China’s markets
Investors must now choose between value and values
n october 23rd China’s ruler, Xi Jinping, asked the Central Committee of the Communist Party to endorse him and his team of loyalists to run the country for the next five years. He had no trouble securing their support. But the next day, he had a lot more difficulty with the highly decentralised committee that is the global financial market.
Foreign investors dumped China’s shares and its currency in spectacular fashion. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng stockmarket index, dominated by mainland firms, fell by over 6%. The sell-off was even worse in New York. The Golden Dragon index of Chinese companies listed on the tech-heavy Nasdaq, which includes giants like Alibaba and Baidu, fell at one point by 20%, reaching levels last seen before Mr Xi took power ten years ago. The offshore yuan, which fluctuates more freely than its onshore counterpart, weakened to its lowest value against the dollar since the market began in 2010 (see chart).
Mr Xi’s third term as leader was no surprise. But he disappointed investors with his picks for the party’s new Politburo and its powerful seven-member Standing Committee. Investors had hoped these bodies would include market-friendly officials, recognised for their ability not just their loyalty. When China’s financial markets plunged in March, investors were reassured by soothing words from Liu He, a Politburo member and a respected economic authority. No one of his stature could voice the same lines today. The upper echelons of China’s communist party lack people whose expertise and experience might provide a check on Mr Xi’s economic instincts.
These instincts have become clearer over time. The word “security”, for example, appeared 91 times in Mr Xi’s report to the party congress on October 16th. Mr Xi is determined to fortify China against America’s strategy of economic containment. He seems less interested in keeping foreign companies happy so that they will speak up against this strategy in their home countries. Faced with “external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China”, he said, “we have shown a fighting spirit and a firm determination to never yield to coercive power.”
Mr Xi’s calls for “common prosperity” also worry foreign investors. His goal of broadening wealth and narrowing inequality has some economic, as well as social, justification. Increasing the share of national income paid to workers could help rebalance China’s economy away from investment towards consumption. Indeed, increasing labour’s slice of the cake is one of the indicators tracked by the imf on its “rebalancing scorecard” for China. But investors fear new taxes on wealth or capital gains. And “common prosperity” has become associated with a clumsy crackdown on some of China’s most successful tech firms.
Mr Xi has shown little interest in reducing the role of state-owned enterprises to give private firms more room to prosper. Instead of urging the state to retreat, he wants the party to advance. “Party building will...be stepped up” in private firms, he said in his report to congress. Colin Hawes of the University of Technology Sydney has argued that private firms have, for the most part, successfully co-opted the party organisations within them. These organisations are often led by the firm’s boss. Their members know that it is the firm not the party that pays their salaries. There is, though, no guarantee this modus vivendi will last, especially in some of the bigger companies favoured by foreign investors.
China’s faltering markets have become “disconnected” from improving fundamentals, according to investment strategists at JPMorgan Chase. Economic data released on October 24th showed that China’s gdp grew by 3.9% in the third quarter, compared with a year earlier. The figure, which appeared later than scheduled, was also faster than expected. Like all Chinese data, it was met with scepticism. But it was not obviously out of line with several lower-profile indicators, like electricity production, which grew by more than 6% over the same period.
The reshuffle of China’s leadership may be provoking a reshuffle of China’s investor base. Given Mr Xi’s growing power and declining pragmatism, investors must ask themselves whether or not they can stomach his philosophy. For investors who can’t, getting out is the only course of action. For those who can, Chinese companies now look cheap relative to their earnings prospects. The future of China’s markets will thus be determined by the tug of war between value and values.
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